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Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium geographical economics
model which uses matching frictions on the labor market to generate
regional unemployment disparities alongside the usual core-periphery
pattern of industrial agglomeration. In the model, regional wage dif-
ferentials do not only influence migration decisions of mobile workers,
but also affect the bargaining process on local labor markets, leading
to differences in vacancies and unemployment as well. In a setting
with two regions, both higher or lower unemployment rates in the
core region are possible equilibrium outcomes, depending on trans-
port costs and the elasticity of substitution. Stylized facts suggest
that both patterns are of empirical relevance.
JEL-Classification: F12, J61, J64, R12
Keywords: Regional labor markets, new economic geography, job matching,
unemployment
1 Introduction
The simultaneous existence of densely and sparsely populated areas is a well-
known empirical phenomenon. New economic geography (NEG) models use
a combination of increasing returns, transport costs and factor mobility to
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describe the formation and persistence of agglomerations as an endogenous
process rather than a result of pure first nature differentials. They recognize
the optimizing behavior of economic agents as the rationale behind regional
patterns of population and industrial density. The classical model has been
proposed by Krugman (1991) and was canonized in Fujita et al. (1999). Since
then, it has been varied and extended in many different ways.1
Another empirical regularity are profound employment and/or unemploy-
ment differentials between regions, even if those regions are in close proximity
and face a comparable institutional setting. It seems natural to expect that
both regional patterns are driven by the same or at least closely related
forces. For example, Suedekum (2005) shows that, evaluated at the NUTS-2
level, densely populated European regions tend to have lower unemployment
rates than peripheral ones.
In recent years, economic theorists have tried to incorporate imperfect
labor markets into the NEG framework to learn more about the connection
between agglomeration forces and labor market differentials.2 There have
been two main ways to attain that goal. One strand of the literature con-
centrates on industrial clustering while not allowing for interregional labor
mobility. This assumption is appropriate if migration is considered being neg-
ligible.3 When explicitly including unemployment4, the result is a negative
relationship between industrial agglomeration and the local unemployment
rate (see Francis, 2003). As a drawback, these models cannot account for
endogenous regional differentials in population densities.
The second class of models allows for regional migration. One example
is the model by Suedekum (2005), who introduces efficiency wages to an an-
alytically solvable agglomeration model. This results in a stable wage curve
relation that is even intensified by migration.5 Another approach is by Epi-
1The original setup using interregional migration has been complemented by models
using intraregional migration and intermediate inputs (e.g. Venables, 1996). Puga (1999)
merges both ideas in a more general framework. There are models that incorporate con-
gestion (e.g. Brakman et al., 1996; Suedekum, 2006) and commuting costs (e.g. Tabuchi,
1998; Borck et al., 2007). Other models deal with more than two regions (e.g. Brakman
et al., 1996; Fujita et al., 1999, chapt. 6). Baldwin et al. (2003, part I) review analytically
solvable variants of the model.
2For a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on regional labor market dif-
ferentials, see Elhorst (2003).
3One example often made in this context are the rather low migration rates between
European regions.
4Monfort and Ottaviano (2002), Picard and Toulemonde (2001) and Picard and Toule-
monde (2006) do not model unemployment.
5Matusz (1996) has a related models that lacks agglomeration forces. Peeters and
Garretsen (2004) deals with unemployment, but allows for it only in the home country.
2
fani and Gancia (2005), who model regional unemployment by introducing
search frictions to a dynamic NEG framework. In both cases, the equilibrium
outcome is again higher unemployment in the periphery.6
Yet, the empirical pattern just mentioned does not hold for more dis-
aggregated data. For example, figure 1 shows population densities and un-
employment rates of West German districts in 2005 on the NUTS-3 level.
More densely populated districts tend to have higher unemployment rates
than those with low density.7 This pattern is not new to the economic lit-
erature. The formal analysis of higher unemployment in urban compared to
rural areas at least goes back to the work of Harris and Todaro (1970). It is
also the decisive feature of the “spatial mismatch” literature, which emerged
to explain high unemployment in the cores of US cities (see Gobillon et al.,
2003, for an overview). My goal is to show how such a pattern can result as
an equilibrium outcome in a NEG model.
This paper introduces job search frictions into a geographical general
equilibrium framework.8 Firms seeking new workers have to bear certain
costs until a vacancy can be filled. These costs are linked to the local wage
level by assuming that some additional workers are needed to carry out the
searching. In the model, regional wage effects created by the well-known
agglomeration and dispersion forces affect expected returns in the bargain-
ing process, thus having feedback effects on wage formation and leading to
unemployment differentials. It is shown that job search costs can result in
both lower or higher unemployment in agglomerations.
When transport costs are high, demand is mainly local and fierce compe-
tition in a core region drives down nominal wages thus bringing them closer
to replacement benefits and increasing unemployment. This is only a long-
run equilibrium as long as transport costs are not too high, which would
6In the case of Epifani and Gancia (2005), in-migration first increases unemployment
in the core region. This effect is then reverted in the long run.
7This relation is significant at any conventional level. The conclusion remains when
using both West and East German districts, albeit with a weaker gradient. East German
districts alone exhibit no significant correlation between density and unemployment rates.
Using the labor force or employee density, the latter defined over both the place of work
or place of residence, leads to similar results.
8Pissarides (1990, Chap. 1) presents a basic equilibrium unemployment model with
search costs. This approach has been extended in the literature in several ways that are
relevant to the model presented here. Ziesemer (2005) introduced monopolistic competi-
tion of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)-type to it. Ortega (2000) and Sasaki (2007) consider
international migration in models with constant-returns production technologies when
matching frictions occur. Sato (2000) shows that a stable wage curve emerges in a search
model if regions with a monocentric city structure and different productivity levels are
included.
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Figure 1: Regional unemployment and population density in Germany
lead to complete dispersion of economic activity. When transport costs are
low, strong supply and demand linkages in the core induce a nominal wage
advantage and thus a lower unemployment rate.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 develops
the basic model. Section 3 states the short-run equilibrium conditions for
the multi-region case. Section 4 shows some illustrative simulations in a
two-region model, performs a sensitivity analysis and discusses the results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We assume an economy that resembles the canonical Core-Periphery model.
There is a manufacturing sector using manufacturing labor to produce a
variety of differentiated goods under monopolistic competition and an agri-
cultural sector using farm workers and a constant-returns technology that
provides a homogenous good. While agricultural workers are immobile,
manufacturing firms and workers are free to locate in any of the economy’s
n = 1, ..., N regions. The following results hold for each region separately. To
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save notation, subscripts for location will not be introduced until section 3.
2.1 Trade in the labor market
The market for agricultural labor is assumed to be perfectly competitive. It
is only the workers and firms in the manufacturing sector that face matching
frictions. With LM being the number of manufacturing workers, unemploy-
ment rate u and vacancy rate v, the number of job matchings per unit time
is given by the matching function9
mLM = m(uLM , vLM) (1)
which is increasing in its arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree 1.
Introducing θ ≡ v/u as an indicator of labor market tightness, the rate at
which vacant jobs are filled can be written as q(θ) = m(u/v, 1) with q′(θ) ≤ 0
and the rate at which unemployed workers are hired is θq(θ). Occupied jobs
get separated with probability δ, so in steady state equilibrium it must hold
that flows into and out of the pool of unemployed workers equalize, thus
δ(1− u)LM = θq(θ)uLM . Solving for u yields the Beveridge curve:
u =
δ
δ + θq(θ)
, ∂u/∂θ < 0. (2)
Assuming δ to be a model parameter independent of location, it is only
differences in labor market tightness that can spur regional disparities in
unemployment rates. The source of these differences will be elaborated in
section 2.5.
2.2 Consumers
The behavior of consumers in the model directly carries over from the stan-
dard core-periphery model like in Fujita et al. (1999). Since nothing crucial
can be learned by making the consumer decision dynamic, we will assume
that all income has to be spent instantly and simply stick to the well known
static formulation.10 Consumers share a common Cobb-Douglas type utility
function for goods from both sectors:
U = MµA1−µ, (3)
9Both rates are measured as a fraction of the manufacturing labor force.
10For details of the derivations in this section, readers are referred to Fujita et al. (1999,
Chapter 4).
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M beeing the composite index of consumed manufactured goods and A bee-
ing consumption of the agricultural good. µ is a constant defining expen-
diture shares. The subutility M is achieved by consuming a continuum of
varieties with range k where quantities are represented by m(i):11
M =
[∫ k
0
m(i)ρdi
]1/ρ
, 0 < ρ < 1. (4)
ρ is directly linked to the elasticity of substitution σ by σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ) and
indicates love-of-variety in manufacturing goods. If ρ rises, consumers will
value variety less.
Keeping the consumers budget constraint in mind and solving the two-
step cost minimization problem shows that demand for each variety can be
expressed as
m(i) = µY
p(i)−σ
G1−σ
for i ∈ [0, k], (5)
and demand for the agricultural good as
A = (1− µ)Y/pA, (6)
where Y is disposable income and p(i) and pA are prices of the manufac-
tured and agricultural goods, respectively. G is the overall price index in
manufacturing. It is defined by:
G ≡
[∫ k
0
p(i)1−σdi
](1/1−σ)
. (7)
2.3 Workers
Workers in manufacturing earn real wage wW when employed and get real
benefit payments zW (measured in consumer prices) when unemployed.12
Assuming they pay a constant tax t in both cases to finance unemployment
insurance, incentives remain unchanged. The tax can thus be left out of the
workers decision problem within a region.13 With U and E as the present-
discounted value of the expected income of an unemployed and employed
worker, respectively, U satisfies
11Thus we may call k the “number” of varieties.
12Nominal benefit payments z are assumed to be constant over regions.
13This has been shown by Ziesemer (2005). The result does not carry over to deci-
sions between regions, because the tax might influence regional real wages and benefits
differently. We will therefore reintroduce the tax system in section 3.
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rU = zW + θq(θ)(E − U), (8)
where r denotes the interest rate. rU can be interpreted as the reservation
wage. It consists of the level of unemployment benefits plus the expected
capital gain from finding a job. The value function of an employed worker is
given by
rE = wW + δ(U − E). (9)
The difference between real wage wW and permanent income of the employed
rE is due to the fact that jobs face the risk of getting separated.
2.4 Producers
The matching friction in the labor market for manufacturing workers arises
because jobs get separated with rate δ and vacancies are costly. The value
function of a vacancy for a firm shall be
rV = −γwF + q(θ)(J − V ), (10)
where J and V are the present-discounted values of expected profit from an
occupied and a vacant job, respectively. wF denotes the real wage from a
firm’s perspective. In steady state, the capital cost equals the rate of return
on the job. The vacant job costs are assumed to be a constant fraction γ of
the real wage. One can think of them as wages for additional employees who
are not engaged in the production process, but instead in human resources.14
Since it is profitable to create new jobs until the value of a vacancy reaches
zero, we get V = 0 as an equilibrium condition, which leads to
J =
γwF
q(θ)
. (11)
In equilibrium the expected profit from a newly filled job equals the expected
costs of a vacancy.
Following Ziesemer (2005), we now introduce an increasing returns pro-
duction technology for manufactures in our model. To produce a quantity x
of any variety at a given location, labor input ` will be
` = F + cx+ γO, (12)
14Linking vacancy costs to wages has two advantages over fixing them to (the real
value of) some arbitrary number. The first advantage is that the conditions for short-run
equilibrium in section 3 get more tractable. As a second advantage, we now explicitly
specify where the vacancy costs go.
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with fixed costs F and the standard variable part cx. The last term enters the
equation because a firm always has to offer a certain number of jobs O to keep
employment from falling. Since each job offer will be filled with probability
q(θ) and occupied jobs get separated with rate δ, the firms expected change
of employment is15
˙` = q(θ)O − δ`. (13)
In steady state, ˙` will be zero. Combining (12) and (13) then yields the
fraction of manufacturing workers who are engaged in a productive task:
F + cx
`
= 1− γδ
q(θ)
. (14)
This expression falls in θ, so the tighter the labor market, the higher the
share of labor engaged in non-productive search activity. Inserting (12) into
(13) and using the envelope theorem we get the transition equation
x˙ =
1
c
[(q(θ)− γδ)O − δ(F + cx)] . (15)
The present-discounted value of the firm’s profit is
Π =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt [p(x)x−W (F + cx+ γO)] dt, (16)
where p is the mill price of the produced good and W denotes nominal wage.
The firm maximizes (16) with respect to the quantity produced x and the
number of vacancies O, and we get the familiar result that optimal price will
be a markup on marginal costs:16
pˆ =
cW
ρ
·
[
1 +
γr
q(θ)
] [
1− γδ
q(θ)
]−1
(17)
Marginal costs here consist of two parts. The first term in brackets represents
the current costs of new production workers, which consist of the wage and
average costs until a job gets filled. The second term in brackets captures
the fact that not all newly hired workers will be employed in production.
∂pˆ/∂θ > 0, so that prices will rise if labor market tightness increases for a
given wage level.
We can also derive an expression for the current value of the expected
value of a job:17
15We use the concept of a large firm proposed by Pissarides (1990), so there is no
uncertainty about the flow of labor.
16See Appendix A.1 for details.
17See Appendix A.2 for details.
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(r + δ)J =
(ρ
c
− wF
)(
1− γδ
q(θ)
)
. (18)
It is therefore the net return generated by a worker times the probability
that a worker actually performs a productive task.
Next, we want to turn to optimal output. Current profit in (16) will be
zero in equilibrium, so we get18
xˆ =
Fρ
c
[
1− ρ+ γr
q(θ)
]−1
. (19)
Inspection of xˆ shows that optimal output falls in θ, which also implies an
absolute decline in per-firm labor input in production. Labor demand is
given by
ˆ`= F
[
1 +
γr
q(θ)
] [
1− ρ+ γr
q(θ)
]−1 [
1− γδ
q(θ)
]−1
(20)
and the number of firms by
kˆ =
LM(1− u)
ˆ`
. (21)
The effect of θ on per firm labor demand and the equilibrium number of firms
is ambiguous. Under certain conditions, a firm will always hire more workers
in a tightening labor market, so the fall in production workforce is more
than offset by rising search employment.19 The effect of θ on productivity
is unambiguously negative, nonetheless. Combining equations (19) and (20),
we get that ∂(xˆ/ˆ`)/∂θ < 0.
The above shows that a change in labor market tightness will not only
have an impact on unemployment rates, but also influence prices and the
structure of production. Until now, we treated θ as exogenous, neglecting
the decision processes of workers and firms affecting job search and offers.
We therefore introduce a wage bargaining process in the next section, thus
endogenizing θ.
2.5 Wage bargaining
A worker and a firm will only agree on a job arrangement if their respective
returns on the job, E and J outweigh their fallback positions U and V.
18See Appendix A.3 for details of the derivations.
19This is true if ρ < δ/(r+δ). See Appendix A.3. Otherwise, the derivative gets negative
for low values of θ.
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Assume they bargain over the matching rent according to a Nash bargaining
game, thus maximizing the weighted product of their net returns from the
job:
arg max
wF
(E − U)β(J − V )1−β, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, (22)
where β is the relative bargaining power of workers. From the first-order
maximization condition we get:20
wF = rU + β
[ρ
c
− rU
]
(23)
Workers receive their reservation wage rU and a fraction β of the net surplus
created in production. This surplus consists of ρ/c, which is a mark-up on
the average product21, and the reservation wage they give up. Substituting
for rU in (23) and rearranging we get22:
g(W ; θ) = (1− β)
[
1− z
W
]
− β γ
q(θ)− γδ [r + δ + θq(θ)] = 0 (24)
In standard matching models an equation like (24) pins down the equilibrium
value of θ as a function of constant parameters. In the remainder of the
paper, we want to look at a model with multiple local labor markets, where
nominal wages might differ regionally due to different levels of agglomeration.
Equation (24) is an implicit function in W and θ. Inspection of the first
derivatives shows that the sign of ∂θ/∂W is positive. Since θ and u are
negatively related (see equation (2)), equation (24) represents a negatively
sloped wage curve relationship. On the labor market, high unemployment is
associated with low wages. But we saw in section 2.4 that high unemployment
(and thus low θ) has a positive effect on firms productivity. Since it gets easier
for them to hire new workers, they will put a smaller share of their resources
into search efforts. For given nominal wages, this leads to lower prices and
20Note that workers real wage wW and firms real wage wF might well be different in
equations (9) and (10). Fortunately, this is not a problem. Because of the structure of
the bargain, one can always scale the value functions for workers in a way resulting in
only one decision variable wF without changing incentives. From (8) and (9) one gets
that E − U = (wF − rU)/(r + δ). The supply condition is V = 0. Equation (23) follows
assuming that θ is given for a single bargain.
21In the absence of any search costs, ρ/c equals the average product. Here,
ρ/c = (xˆ/ˆ`)
[
1 +
γr
q(θ)
] [
1− γδ
q(θ)
]−1
,
because a successful job match frees resources from search.
22See Appendix A.4 for details.
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thus higher real wages. Furthermore, regional wages crucially depend on
demand for local goods. Since the latter arises in all regions and not only
the location where production takes place, we will now have to explicitly take
the regional perspective into account.
3 Regional conditions for equilibrium
As a result of the increasing returns to scale technology, each variety of the
manufactured goods will only be produced in a single location. We will also
assume that all kn varieties produced in a particular location n are symmetric.
Transport costs between regions will take the “iceberg” form, so for one unit
of a good produced in n to arrive at its destination s, Tns units will have to
be shipped.23 So the c.i.f. price at each location is given by the transport
cost weighted f.o.b. price:
pns = pnTns. (25)
Using (7), the price index at location s can be written
Gs =
[
N∑
n=1
kn(pnTns)
1−σ
](1/1−σ)
, s = 1, ..., N. (26)
Substituting (26) into (5) and calling income in region s Ys, we arrive at the
total sales of each variety produced in location n, which is:
xn = µ
N∑
s=1
Ys(pnTns)
−σGσ−1s Tns. (27)
From (19) we know the optimal output of a firm. Equalizing with (27) and
solving for pn yields the break-even price level. But prices also have to satisfy
(17), so we arrive at the wage equation:24
Wn = Ω(θn)
[
N∑
s=1
YsT
1−σ
ns G
σ−1
s
]1/σ
. (29)
23We assume that there are no transport costs for agricultural goods.
24To simplify notation, we choose units such that ρ = c and µ = F . Moreover, we
introduce the function
Ω(θ) =
(
1− ρ+ γr
q(θ)
)1/σ [
1 +
γr
q(θ)
]−1 [
1− γδ
q(θ)
]
. (28)
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This gives the wage that manufacturing firms in region n pay when breaking
even. The term in brackets represents demand and is familiar from the
standard core-periphery model as presented by Fujita et al. (1999). Ω(θ)
is a scaling factor that lies between 0 and (1 − ρ)1−ρ and declines in θ.25
A tighter labor market will increase search costs which for given demand
induces a downward pressure on wages.
Using kn = (1−un)LMn /lˆn and (17) in (26) we can rewrite the price index
equation as a function of nominal wages and labor market conditions:
Gn =
[
1
µ
N∑
s=1
(1− us)LsΩ(θs)σ(WsTsn)1−σ
](1/1−σ)
. (30)
Normalizing wages in agricultural production to unity, nominal income
in location n is
Yn = L
MsMn [(1− un)(Wn − t) + un(z − t)] + LAsAn , (31)
where sMn and s
A
n are the shares of total manufacturing and agricultural
workers employed in region n and un denotes the local unemployment rate.
For the unemployment insurance system to break even, the tax t has to
satisfy
LM t = z
[
N∑
n=1
LMsMn un
]
. (32)
Equations (24), (29), (26), (31) and (32) are the short-run equilibrium
conditions of the model. For a given allocation of manufacturing labor, they
give regional wages, price levels and unemployment rates. Real wages and
real benefits in region n then are
wWn =
Wn − t
(Gn)µ(pA)1−µ
; zWn =
z − t
(Gn)µ(pA)1−µ
. (33)
We assume households of manufacturing workers to be representative in
the sense that the fraction not working equals un. The decision to move
between locations n and s is then driven by the sign of
∆ωns =
[
wWn (1− un) + zWn un
]− [wWs (1− us) + zWs us] . (34)
Since the above problem cannot be solved analytically, the next section
presents numerical simulations to illustrate the main results.
25See Appendix A.5.
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Figure 2: Simulation results for T = 2.1; varying γ
4 Results
4.1 Simulations
The following simulations are carried out for a model of two symmetric re-
gions using the following parameter values: µ = 0.4, σ = 5, γ = 0.1,
z = 0.5, β = 0.5, r = 0.05 and δ = 0.15. Additionally, we assume that
q(θn) = 0.6(θn)
−0.5 and that total labor, agricultural wages and agricultural
prices are normalized to one. Figure 2 shows the resulting real income and
unemployment rate differentials depending on the allocation of manufactur-
ing labor between locations and the size of vacancy costs if transport costs
are relatively high.26
The solid line is the case with no vacancy costs at all (γ = 0), thus
reproducing the standard core-periphery model. With T = 2.1, supply and
demand linkages will not be strong enough to prevent any agglomeration
pattern from collapsing. The only long-run equilibrium exhibits symmetric
allocation of manufacturing.
26The scaling of the right figure is difference in percentage points.
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Figure 3: Simulation results for T = 1.6; varying γ
Introducing labor market frictions through search costs now has the fol-
lowing effects. First, since competition is high in the core and demand is
mainly local due to high transportation costs, nominal wages will be lower
there. This leads to a higher benefit replacement ratio z/W (nominal benefits
are fixed) and is thus accompanied by higher unemployment, which represents
an additional centrifugal force. A higher probability of being unemployed
distracts workers from moving to the core region. Second, the lower labor
market tightness in the core lowers search costs there, which brings down
producer prices. Thus, we have an additional agglomeration force whose
strength depends on the level of transport costs. If they are high, the price
effect will mainly benefit inhabitants of the core region, which translates into
a relatively strong agglomeration force. In figure 2, the latter effect out-
weighs the former, leading to a stronger net agglomeration force. But since
the dispersing force of demand from the peripheral region is stronger, we still
end up with a single long-run equilibrium.
Figure 3 depicts a case when transportation costs are lower (T = 1.6), so
that a core-periphery pattern will emerge in the long run. Again, lower nom-
inal wages lead to higher unemployment in the core compared to the periph-
14
Figure 4: Bifurcation and unemployment
ery, albeit of smaller magnitude than with high transport costs. This time,
however, the additional dispersion force dominates the additional agglom-
eration force since the latter gets reduced by interregional trade relations.
Migration will lead to an equilibrium with higher real income and higher un-
employment in the core region, thus resembling the empirical pattern shown
in section 1.
The above reasoning can be repeated for various levels of transport costs.
The result of this exercise is summarized in figure 4. The left panel shows
the bifurcation diagram with all possible long run equilibria. The right panel
depicts the corresponding unemployment differentials between the two re-
gions27. Starting out from high transport costs, the only stable equilibrium
is a symmetric one, which also means equal unemployment rates. As trans-
port costs fall, a sustain point is reached below which complete agglomeration
of workers in one region is also stable. In that case, unemployment becomes
relatively lower in the peripheral region, as already discussed above.28 When
27For plotting the unemployment differentials, I assume that region 1 comes out as the
core in case of an agglomeration equilibrium.
28Strictly speaking, there is no unemployment in the periphery when agglomeration is
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transport costs fall even further the symmetric equilibrium is no longer stable
and full agglomeration in one region is the only stable long-run equilibrium.
At the same time falling transport costs narrow the unemployment differen-
tial (by strengthening supply and demand linkages and thus narrowing the
nominal wage differential). For very low transport costs this eventually leads
to lower unemployment in the core by further increasing local wages.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
The simulation results from above are derived for specific parameter values.
To learn more about the effect of these parameters on the equilibrium be-
havior of the model, table 1 in the appendix shows wage and unemployment
differentials in the long-run equilibrium when changing parameters one at a
time. This is done both for low and medium transport costs to learn more
about the direction of the effect.
It is a standard result from NEG models that an increase in the share
of the labor force employed in manufacturing or a decrease in the elasticity
of substitution strengthens the forces working towards agglomeration, thus
making a core-periphery pattern a stable equilibrium for higher transport
costs. This is also true in the model including labor market frictions and
can be seen from the increase in the real wage differential in the first two
segments of table 1. It can be easily verified that Wn = (1 − u−1n ) for the
core at full agglomeration. Using this in equation 24 shows that there is a
unique solution for the unemployment rate that does not depend on µ or σ.
But the wage level in the periphery decreases, so that its relative position on
the labor market gets worse. On the other hand, high µ or low σ increase
the range of transport costs which result in lower unemployment in the core.
Looking at the labor market parameters, first note that the effects of
changes on absolute outcomes are similar to the ones in standard equilibrium
search models.29 Rising vacancy costs make job openings less profitable and
induce firms to search less. This increases unemployment and lowers real
wages through its effect on the price level. A similar effect is produced
by increases in the benefit level or workers bargaining power. These make
workers to accept only higher wage offers. In contrast to the base model30,
real income is still lower because higher tax levels eat away at earnings. An
increase in r and s both lead to higher unemployment through a reduction of
anticipated profits, in the former case because future returns are discounted
complete since there are no manufacturing workers present. I define the unemployment
rate in region 2 as the one that would result if a marginal worker decided to leave the core.
29Simulation results are omitted.
30(see Pissarides, 1990)
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at a higher rate and in the latter case because a jobs duration is expected
to fall. A higher job destruction rate also increases the number of workers
entering the unemployment pool in a given period. Finally, a rise in the
matching elasticity increases the amount of jobs that get filled, which implies
a decrease in the unemployment rate.
Table 1 reveals that the effects of those parameter shifts on wage differ-
entials are tiny while they do have a stronger influence on the unemployment
rate (except maybe for r). What emerges is that a falling matching elasticity
or a rise in all the other labor market parameters tend to have a stronger
effect on the region that already has a higher unemployment rate, thus ag-
gravating the regional differential.
The previous simulations might have created the impression that the
forces created by labor market frictions through search costs have a negligi-
ble impact on overall migration decisions. Indeed, as long as the forces from
the standard core-periphery model form a strong pattern of real income dif-
ferences, introducing search costs will not alter them qualitatively. If those
differences are small, however, this might be different. Figure 5 shows real
wage differentials for medium transport costs when workers have low bargain-
ing power. This will get them only a small share of the firm’s productivity
gains when labor markets get less tight, but will result in stronger price
declines, thus benefiting agricultural and unemployed workers as well. The
result is a stronger agglomeration force. The left panel depicts a case where
high search costs change a situation with only one symmetric equilibrium
into one with three equilibria. In the right panel, a rise in γ leads to the
symmetric equilibrium becoming unstable.
4.3 Discussion
Looking at equation (24) reveals that unemployment is relatively higher in
the core region only if nominal wages are lower than in the periphery. This
result needs to be discussed in more detail, since there is a vast empirical
literature pointing to an urban wage premium in the data.31 But equation
(24) shows that for higher urban unemployment rates it suffices to have a
higher replacement ratio z/W . Nominal wages thus can be higher in ag-
glomerations as long as benefit payments are higher, too. For example, an
important driving force for higher urban wages are higher land prices, a fact I
abstracted from in this paper. However, if the unemployed get compensated
31See, for example, Glaeser and Mare (2001) for the U.S. and Haas and Mo¨ller (2003)
for Germany.
17
Figure 5: Simulation results for β = 0.1; varying γ
for higher costs of living, too, this might not pose a serious problem.32
Thus, using reasonable parameter values, the geographical equilibrium
model with search frictions can endogenously create regional patterns of ag-
glomeration and labor market conditions where denser areas show higher
unemployment rates, thus resembling the empirical observations mentioned
in the introduction. How does this fit the findings by Suedekum (2005) of
lower unemployment rates in large scale agglomerations at the NUTS-2 level
of European regions? As the previous simulations show, there are three ways
for the model to create this result: by (i) transport costs becoming really
small, (ii) choosing the industry share to be high or (iii) assuming a low
elasticity of substitution.
There is no reason to believe that transport costs are smaller at the level
of European regions. The only way for this model to accommodate both
findings then is to assume that substitution between goods is easier on the
national level than on the transnational or that the manufacturing share
is considerably higher in German NUTS-3 regions than on the European
32Even if the price for housing does not influence the workers relative fall-back position,
it still has an effect on migration decisions.
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NUTS-2 level.
There are several caveats, however. The above results crucially depend
on the assumption of identical nominal unemployment benefits. This seems
more plausible on the national level, where there is only one unemploy-
ment compensation scheme. Regarding European regions, different national
schemes can be expected to distort the relation between nominal wages and
local fall-back positions, thus leading to different regional patterns. Addi-
tionally, different policies for unemployment benefits and their funding can
alter the outcome. For example, a proportional tax on nominal wages de-
creases after tax wage differentials and thus unemployment differentials. If
one assures that replacement ratios are fixed, no regional unemployment dis-
parities will emerge at all.33 Apart from that, different forms of labor market
frictions might work at the same time, having opposing effects on unemploy-
ment as well as agglomeration and dispersion forces. It might prove to be
difficult to disentangle those effects in empirical settings.
5 Conclusion
This paper introduces job search frictions into a geographical general equi-
librium model. Since job searchers and firms do not meet instantly, there
exists a matching rent that can be bargained over. Employers can increase
the number of matches by relocating a higher share of their resources to
search efforts. Random job destruction ensures that some fraction of work-
ers will always be idle. In the model, regional wage effects created by the
well-known agglomeration and dispersion forces of core-periphery models af-
fect expected returns in the bargaining process, thus having feedback effects
on wage formation and leading to unemployment differentials.
There are two opposing effects on migration decisions. First, higher un-
employment distracts workers from moving into a region through a negative
income effect. Second, firms can find new hires more easily if unemployment
is high, thus having lower vacancy costs. This implies increasing productivity
and decreasing producer prices, which attracts workers to the region. The
net effect depends on the relative strength of those two forces.
Depending on parameter values, the model is consistent with both - higher
or lower unemployment in the core region. High competition between firms
and low demand from other regions brings down nominal wages more strongly
in agglomerations, thus making work less attractive relative to the fall-back
33In our simple model, this just means to hold z/W constant for all regions. In reality,
this might be more complicated, because incentives are not only influenced by wages and
unemployment benefits.
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position. This results in higher unemployment. Low competition and trans-
port costs have the opposite effect. The dependency of the models outcome
on the specific situation makes it more flexible than other approaches. This
seems relevant since both patterns can be found in empirical data.
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A Appendix
A.1 The firm’s optimization strategy
The current-value Hamiltonian for the firm’s problem is
H = p(x)x−W (F + cx+ γO) + λ
c
[(q(θ)− δγ)O − δ(F + cx)] .
From the maximum principle it follows that
∂H/∂O = −γW + λ
c
(q(θ)− δγ) = 0 (35)
and
∂H/∂x = p′x+ p− cW − λδ = −λ˙+ λr. (36)
The transversality condition is
lim
t→∞
[
λ(t)e−rtx(t)
]
= 0.
The change in the co-state λ (see condition (35)) will be zero in steady state.
From (5) we know that p′x/p = −1/σ = ρ − 1. Using this and (35) in (36)
we get equation (17).
A.2 The expected value of a job
From equation (17) we get
ρ
c
= wF
[
1 +
γ(r + δ)
q(θ)− γδ
]
or
ρ
c
− wF = γw
F
q(θ)
[
q(θ)(r + δ)
q(θ)− γδ
]
,
which, together with (11) gives (18).
A.3 Optimal output, labor demand and number of
firms
In equilibrium, current profit will be zero, so
p(x)x−W (F + cx+ γO) = 0. (37)
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From (12) and (13), we get equilibrium job offers
Oˆ =
δ(F + cx)
q(θ)− γδ . (38)
Inserting this and (17) in (37) yields
c
ρ
(
q(θ) + γr
q(θ)− γs
)
Wx−W (F + cx)
(
1 +
γδ
q(θ)− γδ
)
= 0 (39)
or
1
ρ
q(θ) + γr
q(θ)
=
F
cx
+ 1 (40)
which leads to (19). Combining (12), (19) and (38) we get
` = (F + cx)
[
1 +
γδ
q(θ)− γδ
]
= F
[
1 +
γr
q(θ)
] [
1− ρ+ γr
q(θ)
]−1 [
1− γδ
q(θ)
]−1
which is (20).
Defining V (θ) = 1−ρ+ γr
q(θ)
and Γ(θ) =
[
1 + γr
q(θ)
] [
1− γδ
q(θ)
]−1
, the deriva-
tive of labor demand with respect to labor market tightness is
∂ ˆ`
∂θ
= F
Γ′(θ)V (θ)− Γ(θ)V ′(θ)
[V (θ)]2
= Ψ
[
(r + δ)
(
1− γδ
q(θ)
)−1
− r
(
1 +
γr
q(θ)
)(
1− ρ+ γr
q(θ)
)−1]
where
Ψ ≡ −q
′(θ)V (θ)Fγq(θ)−1
[V (θ)]2(q(θ)− γδ) .
The derivative is positive if the term in brackets is positive, which holds if
ρ <
(
1 +
γr
q(θ)
)[
1− r
r + δ
(
1− γδ
q(θ)
)]
. (41)
Inspecting the boundary cases for q(θ) in (41) we get:
q(θ)→∞⇒ ρ < δ
r + δ
and q(θ)→ γδ+ ⇒ ρ < r + δ
δ
.
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The derivative of the equilibrium number of firms with respect to θ is
∂kˆ
∂θ
= kˆ
[
(1− u)′
(1− u) +
V ′(θ)
V (θ)
− Γ
′(θ)
Γ(θ)
]
=
kˆ
θq(θ)
[
(1− ) δq(θ)
δ + θq(θ)
+ 
γr
1− ρ+ γr
q(θ)
−  γ(r + δ)
(1 + γr
q(θ)
)(1− γδ
q(θ)
)
]
,
where  = −θq′(θ)/q(θ) < 1 if the matching function is of the Cobb-Douglas
type. For the derivative to be positive, it suffices for condition (41) not to
hold. Another sufficient condition is
 <
[
1 +
γ(r + δ)
δq(θ)
δ + θq(θ)
(1 + γr
q(θ)
)(1− γδ
q(θ)
)
]−1
.
So, even if equilibrium firm size grows with labor market tightness, there can
still be a rise in the number of firms if the average duration of a vacancy does
not react to changes in θ very strongly. This is because overall employment
growth outweighs the former effect.
A.4 Wage bargaining
Equation (23) can be rewritten as
β
(
ρ/c− wF
r + δ
)
= (1− β)
(
wF − rU
r + δ
)
or
β
[
(J − V )
(
1− γδ
q(θ)
)−1]
= (1− β) (E − U) .
Using this in a firm-price version of (8) we get
rU = zF +
β
1− βγw
F θ
(
1− γδ
q(θ)
)−1
.
Substituting this version of rU into (23) and rearranging we get (24). For
the partial derivatives of g we get that ∂g/∂W > 0 and ∂g/∂θ > 0 if
−q′(θ)θ/q(θ) < 1, which holds if the matching function is of the Cobb-
Douglas type.
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A.5 Equilibrium equations and θ
The boundary cases for q(θ) in Ω(θ) give:
q(θ)→∞⇒ Ω(θ)→ (1− ρ)1−ρ and q(θ)→ γδ+ ⇒ Ω(θ)→ 0.
In addition, inspection of the first derivative of Ω(θ) shows that
∂Ω(θ)
∂θ
> 0⇔ ρ >
(
1 +
γr
q(θ)
)[
1− r
σ(r + δ)
(
1− γδ
q(θ)
)]
.
The last inequality can be rewritten as
Case 1: ρ >
1− τ
ϕ− τ if ϕ− τ > 0;
Case 2: ρ <
1− τ
ϕ− τ if ϕ− τ < 0
where we define
τ :=
r
r + δ
(
1− γδ
q(θ)
)
< 1;
ϕ :=
1
1 + γr
q(θ)
< 1.
But 0 < ρ < 1, so the derivative has to be negative.
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Table 1: Relative income and unemployment rate for alternative parameters
T = 1.2 T = 1.5
ω1 − ω2 u1 − u2 ω1 − ω2 u1 − u2
µ = 0.3 0.03823 0.02957 -0.00579 0.43805
0.4 0.06107 -0.03218 0.04641 0.35364
0.5 0.08119 -0.10169 0.09205 0.25006
σ = 3 0.06376 -0.11426 0.10150 -0.01823
5 0.06107 -0.03218 0.04641 0.35364
7 0.04474 0.06640 -0.01329 0.57967
γ = 0.05 0.06257 -0.02528 0.04757 0.27637
0.1 0.06107 -0.03218 0.04641 0.35364
0.15 0.05995 -0.03641 0.04554 0.40151
z = 0.3 0.06123 -0.01321 0.04659 0.14943
0.5 0.06107 -0.03218 0.04641 0.35364
0.7 0.06072 -0.07328 0.04597 0.76708
β = 0.2 0.06071 -0.01835 0.04899 0.20123
0.5 0.06107 -0.03218 0.04641 0.35364
0.8 0.05904 -0.04842 0.04250 0.53666
r = 0.02 0.06110 -0.03168 0.04644 0.34811
0.05 0.06107 -0.03218 0.04641 0.35364
0.1 0.06100 -0.03302 0.04638 0.36275
s = 0.05 0.06452 -0.01397 0.04911 0.15157
0.15 0.06107 -0.03218 0.04641 0.35364
0.3 0.05636 -0.04469 0.04276 0.49790
elasticity -0.3 0.06252 -0.03783 0.04637 0.40969
of q(θ) -0.5 0.06107 -0.03218 0.04641 0.35364
-0.7 0.05925 -0.02160 0.04667 0.24041
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